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ABSTRACT: This essay seeks to complicate and integrate Goodnight’s spheres-of-argument model by 
investigating the ethos of the science adviser. Uncertainty types correlate with argument spheres; understanding 
this—and understanding the science adviser’s ethos as both forum-bound role and transgressive character 
performance—are crucial factors for advisers’ selection of appropriate ethical stances in public debates. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty as a topic of argument stands in a special relationship to ethos—persuasive 
performances of authority and character—because there must always be an un/certain “I” or 
“we.” Uncertainty is the goad that drives us to locate ourselves and others on the map of the 
cosmos, and argumentation is the techne we have developed to manage this cosmology. This 
was the essential insight behind Thomas Goodnight’s (1982) Spheres of Argument model. 
Goodnight (1982) reasoned that “all argumentation is involved in the creative resolution or the 
resolute creation of uncertainty” (p. 215) but noted that these arguments appeared to be 
grounded in three distinct spheres: personal, technical, and public. Managing uncertainty in the 
personal sphere involved appeals to individual experience or perception and often took place 
on an intimate scale; managing uncertainty in the technical sphere required the standards and 
forums of a profession; managing uncertainty in the public sphere recruited shared political 
values and took place in ostensibly open forums such as courts, legislatures, and rallies 
(Goodnight, 1982, p. 216). Goodnight pointed out that a single issue, such as a murder trial, 
could recruit reasons from multiple spheres even if it took place in a forum characteristic to 
one of them (a courtroom); he also demonstrated how an issue, such as a sick child, could 
initiate in the personal sphere and then move through technical (medical) and public (policy) 
spheres over time as attempts to resolve its uncertainties recruited larger and larger working 
groups.  
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 While the spheres model has generated many productive studies of uncertainty, and 
while Goodnight (1982) hinted that these studies “may illuminate the values, character, and 
blindspots of an era, society, or person” (p. 216), the role of ethos in the model remains largely 
unexamined, particularly as it mediates public and technical spheres of argumentation.1 This is 
an oversight worth addressing for a few reasons. Chief among Goodnight’s (1982) concerns 
was the “erosion” of the public sphere by privatized technical activity (p. 221); meanwhile, the 
ethos of the science adviser—a scientist called upon for expert advice in public debates—
appears as a salient mediator between technical and public spheres; therefore, the science 
adviser’s ethos seems like a good place to start searching for specific mechanisms of erosion. 
At the same time, if arguments about uncertainty entail ethos (the un/certain speaker), and 
there are three spheres of uncertainty, it stands to reason that ethos may perform differently in 
these spheres. This insight concords with the oldest known definition of ethos as custom, habit, 
or dwelling place—in other words, a role traditionally associated with a procedure or forum for 
managing uncertainty (Hyde, 2004). However, we must remember that ethos is also 
character—that combination of good sense (phronesis), moral excellence (arête), and goodwill 
(eunoia) that warrants the claims a person makes about the world (Aristotle, trans. 2007, 
2.1378a5). So, when a science adviser expresses uncertainty, she both articulates her character 
and locates herself in a particular forum of argumentation.  
 These warranting and orienting functions of ethos usefully complicate Goodnight’s 
model by directing our attention to how character performances and forum-specific roles 
interact to integrate spheres of argumentation. They also help explain the otherwise 
unpredictable reception of science advisers in the public sphere, a reception that tends to 
oscillate between “doctor worship” and witch-hunt (Wood, 1964, p. 43). In this paper we 
clarify the interactions of uncertainty type, forum of argumentation, and character performance 
in the reception of science advisers, using several historical cases as touchstones. 
Understanding these interactions, we contend, can help explain the erosion of the boundaries 
between public and technical spheres and can help science advisers select more effective 
ethical performances in public debates. 
2. ETHOS AND THE SPHERES 
In his flagship article, Goodnight (1982) does not provide a full-fledged theory of how the 
spheres of argument stay integrated in a polity, yet this integration is key to the “so what?” of 
his model: namely, that public deliberation is disappearing into personal and technical spheres. 
What are the channels that enable this erosion? Goodnight (1982) mentions a “disagreement” 
as one channel that opens kairos after kairos in sphere after sphere until the uncertainty at stake 
is resolved or loses its exigence (p. 218); however, Goodnight seems to believe disagreements 
refresh rather than sap public argumentation. Another, more suspect channel is the mass media, 
via which “deliberation is replaced by consumption” (Goodnight, 1982, p. 223); but while it is 
easy to see how media consumption might expand personal grounds of evaluation at the 
expense of public grounds, it is harder to see how it would expand the purview of the technical 
sphere.  
                                                1 Doxtader (2000) addresses ethos as a “moderator” and anchor of public sphere argumentation but does not 
consider it as an integrator of Goodnight’s spheres. 
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 A more likely agent responsible for sequestering public argumentation in technical 
forums is hinted at in Goodnight’s (1982) lengthy quotations from Charles Beard, the pre-
eminent historian of early 20th century American technocracy: the technocratic science adviser. 
Not only do science advisers physically travel back and forth from technical to public forums 
of argumentation, but technical arguments crucially depend on their ethos. When a science 
adviser says “I believe humans are causing climate change because my models all point to 
industry as the prime driver of warming,” certainly the reasons (“my models point to 
industry…”) and the grounds (evidence showing that the scientists’ models do in fact point to 
industrial drivers) of that argument are technical. Nonetheless, this argument only coheres if 
the audience buys its warrant, which is something like “my models are reliable techne for 
determining climate change.” Since the science adviser made the models, the warrant really 
comes to roost in the character of the adviser herself, in her technical ethos. 
 Here is the crux of the matter: the adviser’s technical ethos has two parts—a role that is 
bound to technical forums for managing uncertainty; and a character that, while it was 
developed in technical forums, nonetheless travels with her like a lab coat from sphere to 
sphere in the course of her daily life. Because technical character can travel in this way, it 
helps integrate public and technical spheres of uncertainty management: we call on technical 
experts to help resolve uncertainties in public debate, and this conversation keeps the spheres 
of argumentation connected and porous.  
 However, the eminent portability of ethos-as-character can create conflicts with ethos-
as-role in a particular forum. We are all familiar with these kinds of clashes: consider the eye-
rolling that commences when a psychologist friend starts pontificating about the behavior of 
the people at a party (technical ethos performed in a personal forum), the snickering about the 
personal tics of a politician (personal ethos performed in a public forum), the denunciations 
following a scientist expressing their political views at a professional meeting (personal ethos 
performed in a technical forum). These clashes of character and forum are easy to recognize in 
our daily lives, but we have yet to treat them seriously in the public reception of science 
advisers. The first step is understanding how types of uncertainty—personal, technical, and 
political (public)—condition the expected roles of scientists in those forums. The next step will 
be to consider what happens when science advisers carry all three of their characters—
personal, technical, and political—into public forums.  
3. ETHOS AND UNCERTAINTY IN SCIENCE ADVISING: FORUM 
We are in the last phases of conducting a review of the literature on the topos of uncertainty in 
scientific argumentation. This review has made it clear to us that uncertainty is a boundary 
object not just between academia and the polis but even among the academic disciplines that 
work on the problem. Unique definitions of uncertainty populate the literature on systems 
modeling, cognitive psychology, linguistics, philosophy, rhetoric, sociology, and political 
science—and yet scholars of scientific argumentation who work with sources from several or 
all of these disciplines often persist in using the term as if it has a single, consensual definition. 
While this kind of willful misunderstanding has been shown to be helpful in scaffolding 
collaboration across political borders (Shackley & Wynne, 1996; Zehr, 1999), we must be able 
to recognize the characteristics of different spheres of uncertainty argumentation because they 
yield different consequences for the ethical performances of science advisers.  
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3.1 Personal Uncertainty 
Personal uncertainties revolve around expressions of commitment to particular claims about 
the world. Cognitive psychologists, epistemologists, linguists, and rhetoricians have studied 
personal uncertainty in scientific argument, and they have focused in particular on hedging 
(e.g., “We believe the results are robust” v. “the results are robust” (Hyland, 1998)), claim 
strength (e.g., “Evapotranspiration is the primary predictor of plant resilience” v. “We found 
evapotranspiration to be a significant driver of plant resilience within the study area” (Latour 
& Woolgar, 1986, pp. 75–90)), and accommodation (e.g., the tendency of scientific arguments 
to move up-stasis, generalize, and emphasize novelty as they recruit wider publics; cf. 
“Scientists have discovered an antioxidant peptide in mussels” v. “Scientists find cure for 
cancer!” (Fahnestock, 1986)).  
 These expressions of personal un/certainty are regulated by norms, the most famous 
formulation of which is Merton’s (1973) CUDOS: communism (the scientist should relate 
herself to scientific knowledge not as an individual owner but as a member of a community); 
universalism (the scientist’s nationality or ethnicity should not perturb the knowledge s/he 
acquires); disinterestedness (the scientist’s personal agendas should not taint the knowledge 
s/he acquires); and organized skepticism (the scientist’s job is to question rather than to 
commit herself to scientific knowledge). Mertonian norms prohibit strong expressions of 
personal commitment to beliefs about nature or to policy predicated on these beliefs. These are 
norms, not descriptions: in practice, individual scientists have been observed to be selfish, 
parochial, biased, and dogmatic (Barnes, 1970; Mitroff, 1974). But that does not stop them 
from giving lip-service to the norms and enforcing them on their colleagues.  
3.2 Technical Uncertainty 
Technical uncertainties concern scientists’ instruments and techniques—which we will 
combine under the heading techne—for constructing knowledge about nature. Technical 
uncertainties include those about whether techne are sensitive enough to register the 
phenomena of interest (metrical uncertainty), uncertainties about whether models are taking 
into account all the important drivers of a particular phenomenon (structural uncertainty), and 
uncertainties about how to interpret model results (translational uncertainty; Rowe, 1994). 
These uncertainties frequently catalyze public debates about associated risks, especially 
regarding climate change and nuclear energy. Into these debates the scientist is called as an 
adviser on the warrant of her technical character.  
 Technical character and the techne of uncertainty reduction (models, etc.) exist in a 
kind of ethical symbiosis: the reliability of the techne stand on the reputation of the scientist; 
meanwhile, the scientist’s reputation stands on the strength of the techne she has developed for 
reducing uncertainty. This symbiotic relationship can result in techne standing in as a proxy for 
technical character in public debates about uncertainty. Carolyn Miller (2003) found in her 
study of the Rasmussen report that when audiences asked for judgments about risks, science 
advisers tended to defer to their models. The models thus stood in for the advisers’ technical 
character and gave them deniability in the case of error or disaster (Miller, 2003, p. 184). 
Miller called this proxy function “technical ethos”; we will temporarily rename it “techne-
ethos” to avoid confusion with the terminology of Goodnight’s model. 
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3.3 Political Uncertainty 
Political uncertainties—those negotiated in the public sphere—do not concern questions of 
knowledge but questions of right action based on shared values. So, we are not dealing here 
with comprehension but with conviction; not scientific certainty, which is a patent 
impossibility, but political certainty, which is temporarily and provisionally achievable in 
policy. And yet the two categories are conflated all the time in policymaking (Pielke, 2007, p. 
35). Both scientists and politicians present the reduction of scientific uncertainty as a means to 
political certainty, a myth that covers up the role that political values must play in constructing 
political certainty. This myth scaffolds the continued collaboration of politicians and scientists 
(Shackley & Wynne, 1996, p. 280); it is also the chief facilitator of the problem that most 
worried Goodnight (1982)—the cooption of public argumentation by the technical sphere. 
4. ETHOS AND UNCERTAINTY IN SCIENCE ADVISING: CHARACTER 
Now that we have reviewed the way that spheres of uncertainty argumentation shape the roles 
science advisers are expected to play in personal, technical, and public forums, we can turn to 
considering the interaction of these forum-specific roles with the advisers’ performances of 
character.  
 Generally speaking, scientists’ character performances are well-received if they take 
place in the forum that originally shaped them, e.g., technical character in technical forums, 
personal character in personal forums. But something odd happens to scientists in public 
forums: performances of political character (i.e., arguments grounded in appeals to shared 
values and warranted by citizenship) are not predictably felicitous; in fact, they’re often 
strongly censured. Why?  
 The obvious answer is that we seem to expect science advisers to continue to perform 
technical character in political forums: after all, technical expertise formed the grounds for 
their public calling in the first place. But a logical fallacy hides in this reasoning: the warrant 
provided by technical expertise does not support political arguments. Political arguments—in 
Goodnight’s (1982) model—engage political, not technical, uncertainties; are grounded in 
shared values, not techne; and are warranted by political character, not technical character. For 
example, in an argument about whether cap-and-trade violates the spirit of free-market 
capitalism, the warrant is “free-market capitalism is important to preserve,” a value that a 
science adviser’s methods and models have no traction on and that does not reference her 
expertise. 
 Yet, we continue to call scientists into public debates and to insist against logic and 
practical experience that the reductions in technical uncertainty they can provide will 
automatically yield reductions in political uncertainty. This insistence is not founded in 
technical ignorance but on a model of argumentation that pre-dates Goodnight’s (1982) model 
and does not distinguish between technical and public spheres. This Enlightenment model for 
integrating science and policy tapped natural philosophers (the precursors of our scientists), 
who were fast discovering the laws that governed all of nature (including human society), as 
those best qualified to make policy. This technocratic or progressive model unproblematically 
derived values from facts, conflated technical and political certainties, and called on the 
science adviser to serve as both arbiter of information and evaluative decision maker (Ferris, 
2010, p. 104; Shapin, 2008, p. 24).   
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 But the progressive model is not the only model that dictates the roles our science 
advisers should play in public forums. A powerful competitor arose in response to abuses of 
technocracy: the is/ought model, articulated on grounds first laid by David Hume (1740/2010), 
pursues the logical conundrum articulated above in our discussion of the differences between 
technical and political uncertainty—namely, that you cannot derive what you “ought” to do 
from what “is” the case with nature or society; a value structure must always be interpolated 
before policy can be made (Shapin, 2008, p. 11). This is the model that split the technical and 
political spheres. Under the is/ought model, scientists are admonished to do their work in the 
technical sphere and then somehow pass the results through the membrane separating that 
sphere from the public sphere to politicians. The politicians then attach shared values to the 
technical information and make policy on that foundation. 
 Both models still operate, waxing and waning with the political tides and creating an 
unpredictable ethical atmosphere for science advisers. When progressive administrations are in 
power, or when there is a strong national consensus on an issue, the progressive model of 
science-policy integration dominates, and science advisers achieve powerful policymaking 
positions that license their performances of political character. However, if they refuse to make 
policy recommendations in these milieu for some reason—perhaps the habitual practice of 
CUDOS or fear of reprisal from peers in the technical sphere—they can be censured for 
obstructing policymaking or lose ground to other scientists who are willing to advocate policy 
(Brooks, 1964, pp. 85–86; Pielke, 2007, p. 16). While surely exasperating to the science 
adviser, these pressures are appreciable from the politician’s perspective: if you have reached 
out in a crisis for advice to someone you believe has special access to knowledge, someone 
whom you have given millions of dollars to secure this knowledge, you don’t want to hear 
“We don’t have enough data to say for sure” or “We don’t know.” You want answers. 
 When conservative administrations come to power, on the other hand, or when issues 
seriously divide public opinion, science advisers are predictably censured for performing 
personal or political character, as such performances are considered to have transgressed the 
scientist’s proper sphere (technical), even when the adviser has been called into a political 
forum. The science adviser wears the stereotype of CUDOS into public forums like a lab coat, 
and politicians and citizens are just as likely as peers to punish a science adviser’s expressions 
of emotion, personal values, or loyalty to a particular party (Porter, 1995, p. 7).  
In a pluralist democracy such as the United States, the political footing for science 
advisers becomes even more unstable when, say, a progressive executive squares off against a 
conservative Congress—a charged environment of conflicting values. In these situations, a 
science adviser can find herself, on a relatively short time span, welcomed into the public 
sphere on the progressive model and then charged with trespassing on the is/ought model. Such 
was Robert Oppenheimer’s experience between his appointment to the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s advisory committee by Truman in 1947 and the stripping of his security 
clearance by Eisenhower in 1954; similarly, Michael Mann was appointed to the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1998 but, beginning in 2005, 
investigated by Congress (and six other agencies) after the publication of the infamous 
“hockey stick” graph in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (2001). 
 To cope with this volatile ethical environment, science advisers have chosen a range of 
ethical strategies, but most fall into two categories: foregrounding technical character (techne-
ethos), and foregrounding political character (prophetic ethos). We will briefly examine some 
illustrative historical cases in these categories: there are no salient examples of science advisers 
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hewing to the personal rigors of CUDOS because refusing to make policy recommendations on 
the grounds of Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism virtually guarantees that a scientist 
won’t last as a science adviser (Jasanoff, 1994, p. 16; Pielke, 2007, pp. 4–5). 
4.1 Foregrounding Technical Character (Techne-Ethos) 
Some science advisers choose to foreground their methods and models as proxies for 
performances of technical character in public forums. Miller (2003) was the first to document 
such a case, as mentioned above. Jamieson (2000) observed that economists pushed criticism 
of their work off on their models, which were amenable to quick repair and improvement in a 
way that their technical reputations were not (p. 319). Walsh (2013) found that a similar 
strategy involving climate visualizations helped IPCC scientists deflect attacks on their 
technical character (pp. 179–180). However, these studies also noted side effects: first, 
deploying techne-ethos as a shield can lead stakeholders to believe that the techne somehow 
work independently of the scientist who created them, that they channel natural truths directly 
and unproblematically; this misconception Walsh (in press) has labeled the “myth of natural 
inscription.” As a result of this myth, a second side effect emerges: stakeholders come to 
believe that techne, not people, make policy—thus complicating justice and accountability in 
science policymaking.  
4.2 Foregrounding Political Character (Prophetic Ethos) 
Science advisers can respond to the volatility of the public sphere by foregrounding their 
political character and calling for policy change on the basis of their special access to 
knowledge in the technical sphere. Walsh (2013) calls this performance of political character 
by scientists “prophetic ethos.” There are multiple historical examples of science advisers 
performing prophetic ethos with variable success. 
 Frequently, science advisers are censured for performances of prophetic ethos, 
particularly under conservative administrations or in periods of high political uncertainty. 
Robert Oppenheimer embraced prophetic ethos in the wake of the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, sitting on a number of government advisory boards and giving press interviews in 
which he intoned aphoristic warnings such as “the physicists have known sin,” and “we [the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R.] can be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the 
other, but only at the risk of his own life” (Bird & Sherwin, 2006, pp. 323, 465). As indicated 
above, a change in administrations put Oppenheimer in front of an ethics panel that ended his 
career as a federal science adviser. Along the same lines, climatologist James Hansen has 
performed prophetic ethos for the last 25 years, during which he testified before Congress on 
the dangerous “greenhouse effect,” was arrested for sit-in protests of coal mining operations, 
and published books with titles like Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming 
Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity. Hansen has experienced a mixed 
reception of this prophetic performance: on the one hand, he is one of the most recognized 
public figures associated with climate change debates, and he is credited with putting global 
warming on the national radar. On the other hand, he has claimed to be repeatedly and 
systematically censored by Bush administration officials, and he cast his recent retirement 
from NASA as a response to these pressures (Gillis, 2013). 
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 In other instances, science advisers have managed to avoid censure and even catalyze 
policy by performing prophetic ethos. For example, in the kairos surrounding the publication 
of Silent Spring, Goodnight (1982) and Walker (2013) both observed how Rachel Carson 
leveraged growing public awareness of a crisis in the use of pesticides, a crisis that had been 
sequestered until very recently in the technical sphere, in government labs and the confidential 
internal reports of chemical companies. Against the technocratic ethos of these experts, Carson 
performed a prophetic ethos, speaking on behalf of silenced mothers and crop-workers. She 
positioned herself as the people’s science adviser, helping them retake the halls of government 
from the usurping technocrats. She testified before two federal committees and was credited in 
the eventual banning of DDT (though she had never explicitly advocated a ban) and the 
formation of the Environmental Protection Agency (which she did explicitly advocate).  
 Likewise, atmospheric physicists F. Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina (1994) 
illustrate a case in which the very scientists who discovered the chemical reactions depleting 
the ozone were also among the first to call for action to stop it and to avert immanent threats. 
Like Carson, Rowland and Molina took their jeremiad to various polities and were heavily 
criticized by peers, industry, and politicians for doing so, yet they prevailed and even 
augmented their technical characters through the political fight.  
 While these prophetic performances succeeded in many ways, it is clear that they did 
not bootstrap the agency necessary to catalyze international policy; rather, this agency flowed 
from a whole series of events that increased political certainty on the issues involved. Carson’s 
performance rode a cresting wave of public fears about chemical and nuclear contaminants, 
benefited from the media attention already attracted to these fears, and was warmly received by 
an incoming progressive administration. She also escaped typical channels of censure since she 
was an independently funded scholar. Rowland and Molina’s performance took advantage of a 
series of heat waves, vivid images of the ozone “hole,” and existing cancer frameworks, to 
name a few amplifiers. All of these factors were clearly beyond the science advisers’ control. 
Thus, while these successful performances of prophetic ethos are instructive, they are not 
necessarily replicable.  
5. CONCLUSION  
Our examination of the interaction of forum and character in the ethical performances of 
science advisers suggests a new explanatory account of Goodnight’s (1982) concerns about the 
cooption of public argumentation by the technical sphere. First, the spheres model is 
substantially enabled by the is/ought model for science-policy integration, which “divided the 
waters” of the technical and public spheres in response to ethical abuses by technocrats. As a 
result, the public-forum role assigned to science advisers brings with it two incompatible 
spheric models—one that insists upon and one that refuses to recognize the segregation of the 
political from the technical. Finally, the conflation of technical and public uncertainties 
inherent to the progressive model licenses illogical but persuasive technical warrants for public 
arguments; this rhetorical situation encourages politicians either to cloak their advocacy 
positions in techne (Pielke, 2007, p. 89), or to abdicate technical issues to science advisers, and 
thus to the technical sphere (Lapp, 1965, p. 227). 
 This account is productive for re-considering the integration—both salubrious and 
problematic—of the spheres of argumentation, but a question remains: what is the best ethical 
stance for a science adviser in public debates about uncertainty? It should be clear by this point 
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that there is no one-size-fits-all ethical solution to this dilemma. There can be no ethos without 
kairos, and so a performance of technical ethos that is felicitous for one crisis, time, and forum 
will not remain so when those kairotic factors shift. That being said, as we enumerated the 
challenges science advisers have faced in selecting effective ethical strategies, we also 
observed some felicitous patterns: 1.) When technical uncertainties are at stake in public 
debates, shifting the warrant of argument to techne (the reliability of models and methods) 
appears to insulate science advisers’ character from attack, even as it reinforces the conflation 
of technical and political uncertainties; 2.) Under progressive administrations, prophetic 
performances of political character by science advisers tend to be rewarded, and policy gets 
made (and often, but not always, the opposite also holds); and 3.) When stakeholders believe 
that a public crisis has been illegitimately sequestered in the technical sphere, or when a broad 
consensus begins to emerge on a technical issue, a science adviser may effectively perform 
prophetic ethos to galvanize popular support for policy change.  
 These are observations, not recommendations, but they do support our contention that 
scientists must consider the types of uncertainty at stake—personal, technical, and/or 
political—as well as the forum they are arguing in when selecting an appropriate ethical 
stance; the stakes are particularly high for science advisers arguing in public forums.2 This is 
the principal counsel we can offer science advisers—along with the recommendation to study 
cases of uncertainty management that bear on their particular situations before stepping into a 
public forum to argue about their work.  
  
                                                2 This caution particularly applies to readers of Pielke’s (2007) Honest Broker framework. Pielke creates a two-
by-two matrix defined by “Views of Science” (as integrated in a “linear” fashion with policy or as an iterative 
negotiation of scientific opportunity and social need) and “Views of Democracy” (Madisonian pluralist 
advocacy or Schattschneiderian voting on options selected by technocrats). The result is four “ideal” roles a 
science adviser can play: the pure scientist, the science arbiter, the issue advocate, and the honest broker. 
Pielke argues that all four ideal roles should be in circulation for science policy to function well in a 
democracy, but he’s partial to the honest broker—while warning that organizations, not individuals, are best 
suited for this role and that even honest broker organizations are likely to lose political competitions with issue 
advocates, who are happy to comply with politicians’ demands to narrow and simplify rather than expand and 
enrich policy landscapes. He provides a heuristic for science advisers to select the appropriate role: in cases of 
“values consensus and low uncertainty,” advisers should serve as pure scientists or science arbiters. In all other 
cases (lack of consensus and low uncertainty, lack of consensus and high uncertainty, consensus and high 
uncertainty), he encourages advisers to choose between issue advocate and honest broker, depending on 
whether they want to narrow or expand policy options. The difficulty for rhetoricians wishing to apply 
Pielke’s heuristic to historical cases is that it is not rhetorical; thus, it brackets out the role of ethos and kairos. 
First, it doesn’t acknowledge the kairotic instability of the science advisers’ public role. We have seen in the 
cases reviewed that the is/ought model and progressive model can conflict in defining this role on short time 
scales and even between agencies with which the science adviser has to work—and yet forum and kairos are 
bracketed out of Pielke’s heuristic and its generative framework. Second, the heuristic does not acknowledge 
the unique category of personal uncertainties (expressions of commitment), lumping them in with political 
uncertainties (expressions of citizenship/articulations of shared values) and thus conflating political certainty 
with political consensus. A group can have consensus on the range and strength of its shared values and still be 
unable to commit to taking action if there is no exigence, no kairotic moment. Pielke assumes a high level of 
exigence in all science policy issues, but this is not always the case. A science adviser’s sense of exigence, and 
thus her level of personal commitment to a policy option, clearly makes a difference when she is trying to 
choose between issue advocacy and honest brokerage.  
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